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Single Idea 2708

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism ]

Full Idea

In any 'ought' statement there is implicit a principle which says that the statement applies to all precisely similar situations.

Gist of Idea

An 'ought' statement implies universal application

Source

Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.456)

Book Ref

'A Companion to Ethics', ed/tr. Singer,Peter [Blackwell 1993], p.456

A Reaction

No two situations can ever be 'precisely' similar. Indeed, 'precisely similar' may be an oxymoron (at least for situations). Kantians presumably like this idea.

The 20 ideas from Richard M. Hare

22331 Moral statements are imperatives rather than the avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Hare, by Glock]
22484 Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Hare, by Foot]
6449 The categorical imperative leads to utilitarianism [Hare, by Nagel]
2855 In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hare, by Hooker,B]
16050 The goodness of a picture supervenes on the picture; duplicates must be equally good [Hare]
4125 Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B]
4126 If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare]
4127 If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare]
4360 By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright [Hare]
22483 A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare]
2703 Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
2704 If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
2705 How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
2707 If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
2708 An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
2709 Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
2710 Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
2711 Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
2712 You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]