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Full Idea
In any 'ought' statement there is implicit a principle which says that the statement applies to all precisely similar situations.
Gist of Idea
An 'ought' statement implies universal application
Source
Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.456)
Book Ref
'A Companion to Ethics', ed/tr. Singer,Peter [Blackwell 1993], p.456
A Reaction
No two situations can ever be 'precisely' similar. Indeed, 'precisely similar' may be an oxymoron (at least for situations). Kantians presumably like this idea.
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |