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Full Idea
To make moral judgements is implicitly to invoke some principle, however specific.
Gist of Idea
Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle
Source
Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.458)
Book Ref
'A Companion to Ethics', ed/tr. Singer,Peter [Blackwell 1993], p.458
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |