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Single Idea 2720

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory ]

Full Idea

The sense-datum theory is mainly to explain hallucinations and illusions, though there might be other theories, such as the 'adverbial' theory.

Gist of Idea

Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations

Source

Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.36)

Book Ref

Audi,Robert: 'Epistemology: a contemporary introduction' [Routledge 1998], p.36

The 27 ideas from Robert Audi

20064 Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R]
2716 To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R]
2717 How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R]
2718 Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R]
2719 Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R]
2720 Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R]
2721 If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R]
2722 Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R]
2724 I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R]
2725 To remember something is to know it [Audi,R]
2726 We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R]
2715 Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R]
2727 Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R]
2728 The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R]
2729 Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R]
2730 Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R]
2731 Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R]
2732 Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R]
2733 It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R]
2734 A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R]
2735 Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R]
2736 We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R]
2737 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R]
2738 Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R]
2739 Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R]
2740 A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R]
2741 The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R]