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Single Idea 2730
[filed under theme 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
]
Full Idea
Taking the proposition that gold is malleable to be necessary does not commit one to considering it analytic.
Gist of Idea
Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic
Source
Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.116)
Book Ref
Audi,Robert: 'Epistemology: a contemporary introduction' [Routledge 1998], p.116
The
27 ideas
from Robert Audi
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20064
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Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control
[Audi,R]
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2716
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To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field
[Audi,R]
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2717
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How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it?
[Audi,R]
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2718
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Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional
[Audi,R]
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2719
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Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities
[Audi,R]
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2720
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Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations
[Audi,R]
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2721
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If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end?
[Audi,R]
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2722
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Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism
[Audi,R]
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2724
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I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting
[Audi,R]
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2725
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To remember something is to know it
[Audi,R]
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2726
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We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives
[Audi,R]
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2715
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Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason
[Audi,R]
|
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2727
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Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic
[Audi,R]
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2728
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The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience
[Audi,R]
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2729
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Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths
[Audi,R]
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2730
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Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic
[Audi,R]
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2731
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Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge)
[Audi,R]
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2732
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Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent
[Audi,R]
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2733
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It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification
[Audi,R]
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2734
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A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system
[Audi,R]
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2735
|
Could you have a single belief on its own?
[Audi,R]
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2736
|
We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty
[Audi,R]
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2737
|
'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified'
[Audi,R]
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2738
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Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief
[Audi,R]
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2739
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Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something
[Audi,R]
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2740
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A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence
[Audi,R]
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2741
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The principles of justification have to be a priori
[Audi,R]
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