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Single Idea 2731
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
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Full Idea
There are four possible kinds of epistemic chain: infinite and unanchored, circular and unanchored, anchored in a belief which is not knowledge, and anchored in a belief which is bedrock knowledge.
Gist of Idea
Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge)
Source
Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.183)
Book Ref
Audi,Robert: 'Epistemology: a contemporary introduction' [Routledge 1998], p.183
A Reaction
About right, though I don't think 'chain' is the right word for what is proposed if justification is to be coherent. The justifications float like lilies in the pond of reason, and a Self (Monet?) seems needed to assess the picture
The
27 ideas
from Robert Audi
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20064
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Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control
[Audi,R]
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2716
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To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field
[Audi,R]
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2717
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How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it?
[Audi,R]
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2718
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Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional
[Audi,R]
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2719
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Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities
[Audi,R]
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2720
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Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations
[Audi,R]
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2721
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If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end?
[Audi,R]
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2722
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Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism
[Audi,R]
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2724
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I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting
[Audi,R]
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2725
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To remember something is to know it
[Audi,R]
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2726
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We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives
[Audi,R]
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2715
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Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason
[Audi,R]
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2727
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Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic
[Audi,R]
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2728
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The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience
[Audi,R]
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2729
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Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths
[Audi,R]
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2730
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Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic
[Audi,R]
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2731
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Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge)
[Audi,R]
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2732
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Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent
[Audi,R]
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2733
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It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification
[Audi,R]
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2734
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A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system
[Audi,R]
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2735
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Could you have a single belief on its own?
[Audi,R]
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2736
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We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty
[Audi,R]
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2737
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'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified'
[Audi,R]
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2738
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Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief
[Audi,R]
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2739
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Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something
[Audi,R]
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2740
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A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence
[Audi,R]
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2741
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The principles of justification have to be a priori
[Audi,R]
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