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Single Idea 2732
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
]
Full Idea
That 7+5=12 and that carrots are nourishing are mutually consistent, but do not exhibit coherence.
Gist of Idea
Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent
Source
Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.192)
Book Ref
Audi,Robert: 'Epistemology: a contemporary introduction' [Routledge 1998], p.192
A Reaction
This shows how difficult it would be to define 'coherent'. Is 'carrots are nourishing' coherent with 'fish are nourishing'? Is the battle of Hastings coherent with the battle of Waterloo?
The
23 ideas
with the same theme
[criticisms of the coherentist view]:
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23206
|
Schematic minds think thoughts are truer if they slot into a scheme
[Nietzsche]
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21497
|
If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments
[Ewing]
|
|
6873
|
Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously
[Goldman]
|
|
8879
|
Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge
[Sosa]
|
|
8813
|
If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress
[Pollock]
|
|
8891
|
My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics
[Bonjour]
|
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8892
|
Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input
[Bonjour]
|
|
8894
|
Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth
[Bonjour]
|
|
3590
|
Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself
[Williams,M]
|
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3589
|
Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected?
[Williams,M]
|
|
2732
|
Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent
[Audi,R]
|
|
2733
|
It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification
[Audi,R]
|
|
2734
|
A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system
[Audi,R]
|
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6354
|
Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
|
6367
|
Coherence theories isolate justification from the world
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
|
10340
|
Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment
[Kusch]
|
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10345
|
Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity
[Kusch]
|
|
7297
|
My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world
[Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
|
|
21496
|
Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely
[Olsson]
|
|
21499
|
Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable
[Olsson]
|
|
21502
|
A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world
[Olsson]
|
|
21512
|
Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable
[Olsson]
|
|
19721
|
Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience
[Mittag]
|