more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 2737

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism ]

Full Idea

Reliabilism cannot specify how reliable a process must be before it grounds knowledge, and it cannot specify what is reliable in the first place. 'Reliable' may become circular, and may mean 'justified'.

Gist of Idea

'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified'

Source

Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.225)

Book Ref

Audi,Robert: 'Epistemology: a contemporary introduction' [Routledge 1998], p.225


A Reaction

The first time you ever read an instrument, or talk to a stranger, you have no indication of reliability. Circularity looks like a big problem. Knowledge must precede reliability?


The 15 ideas with the same theme [objections to reliabilist justification]:

Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate [Russell]
External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour]
A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion [Blackburn]
If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour]
Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M]
'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R]
Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H]
Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine [Zagzebski]
More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee]
If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee]
Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee]
Knowledge from a drunken schoolteacher is from a reliable and unreliable process [Potter]
In a sceptical scenario belief formation is unreliable, so no beliefs at all are justified? [Comesaņa]
How do we decide which exact process is the one that needs to be reliable? [Comesaņa]
Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]