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Single Idea 2756
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
]
Full Idea
Falsehood in a non-basic belief would be a reason to doubt the basic beliefs which support it, once we have admitted that basic beliefs can be false.
Gist of Idea
If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom
Source
Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 4.3)
Book Ref
Dancy,Jonathan: 'Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology' [Blackwell 1985], p.64
A Reaction
The yearning for foundations arises from the yearning for certainty. If one embraces the fallibilist view of knowledge, as I do, then there is little motivation for foundationalism.
The
15 ideas
with the same theme
[contents and origin of foundational beliefs]:
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1670
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When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind
[Aristotle]
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20795
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Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light
[Sext.Empiricus]
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5004
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We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round
[Descartes]
|
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23245
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Knowledge can't be its own foundation; there has to be regress of higher and higher authorities
[Fichte]
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6944
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Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt
[Peirce]
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4257
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The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible
[Bonjour]
|
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2756
|
If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom
[Dancy,J]
|
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8896
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Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct
[Bonjour]
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8853
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Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content
[Williams,M]
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3580
|
Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations
[Williams,M]
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6353
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People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations
[Pollock/Cruz]
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6361
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Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
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4582
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Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed
[Baggini /Fosl]
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8845
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An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief
[Pryor]
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19719
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'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible
[Grundmann]
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