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Single Idea 2757

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy ]

Full Idea

As an inductive argument Mill's argument from analogy (other people have inputs and outputs like mine, so the intermediate explanation must be the same) is weak because it is based on a single instance.

Gist of Idea

The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone

Source

Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 5.3)

Book Ref

Dancy,Jonathan: 'Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology' [Blackwell 1985], p.68


A Reaction

The argument may be 'weak' as a piece of pure logic, but when faced with a strange situation, one's own case seems like crucial evidence, like a single eye-witness to a crime.


The 12 ideas with the same theme [knowing other minds as like our own mind]:

I judge others' feeling by analogy with my body and behaviour [Mill]
If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell]
It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's [Wittgenstein]
To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel [Wittgenstein]
If my conception of pain derives from me, it is a contradiction to speak of another's pain [Malcolm]
I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P]
Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing [Martin,CB]
Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle]
The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J]
You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J]
The argument from analogy is not a strong inference, since the other being might be an actor or a robot [Grayling]
Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin]