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Full Idea
No matter how tight our account of coherence we have to admit that there may be more than one set of coherent propositions (as Russell pointed out (1907)).
Gist of Idea
Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions
Source
Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 8.2)
Book Ref
Dancy,Jonathan: 'Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology' [Blackwell 1985], p.113
| 5423 | If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent [Russell] |
| 5424 | Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell] |
| 5422 | More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell] |
| 2766 | Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J] |
| 6083 | The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn] |
| 4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
| 15334 | The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten] |
| 19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |