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Single Idea 2770

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism ]

Full Idea

Internalists such as Keith Lehrer tend to suggest that we adopt a coherence theory of justification but reject the coherence theory of truth.

Gist of Idea

Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth

Source

Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 8.3)

Book Ref

Dancy,Jonathan: 'Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology' [Blackwell 1985], p.117

A Reaction

I agree with Lehrer. Truth just isn't coherence, for all sorts of well known reasons (found in this database!). High coherence can be totally false. For justification, though, it is the best we have.

The 52 ideas from 'Intro to Contemporary Epistemology'

2744 Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism [Dancy,J]
2743 What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? [Dancy,J]
2745 A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J]
2746 How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J]
2747 Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J]
2749 For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J]
2752 Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J]
2751 Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence [Dancy,J]
2753 Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J]
2754 Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification [Dancy,J]
2756 If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J]
2755 If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J]
2757 The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J]
2758 You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J]
2760 Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications [Dancy,J]
2761 If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language? [Dancy,J]
2763 There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs [Dancy,J]
2762 Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours [Dancy,J]
2765 Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J]
2769 If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J]
2766 Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J]
2768 The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J]
2767 If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J]
2771 Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J]
2770 Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J]
2772 Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J]
2773 Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J]
2775 It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J]
2776 Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J]
2779 Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J]
2777 Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J]
2778 Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J]
2781 Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties [Dancy,J]
2780 Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism [Dancy,J]
2782 We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist [Dancy,J]
5677 Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived [Dancy,J]
5678 Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J]
5681 Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J]
5679 We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J]
5680 For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J]
5682 Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J]
5683 Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG]
5684 Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences [Dancy,J]
2784 Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J]
2785 Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J]
2786 For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J]
2788 If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J]
2787 Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J]
2790 I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J]
2791 Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J]
2794 Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth [Dancy,J]
2797 As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth [Dancy,J]