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Single Idea 2775
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
]
Full Idea
The question whether something which appears as datum should remain as accepted fact is one which is not even partially determined by its origin as datum.
Gist of Idea
It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts
Source
Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 8.5)
Book Ref
Dancy,Jonathan: 'Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology' [Blackwell 1985], p.123
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[what sense-data would consist of]:
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22013
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Subjects distinguish representations, as related both to subject and object
[Reinhold]
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6483
|
Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain
[Russell, by Robinson,H]
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8244
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Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science
[Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
|
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6462
|
Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics
[Russell]
|
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6463
|
Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do
[Russell]
|
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6464
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Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject
[Russell]
|
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6467
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No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once
[Russell]
|
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7549
|
If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist
[Russell]
|
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7553
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Sense-data are purely physical
[Russell]
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17642
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The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty
[Putnam]
|
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6457
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Sensations are mental, but sense-data could be mind-independent
[Vesey]
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6454
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Where do sense-data begin or end? Can they change? What sort of thing are they?
[Lacey]
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6453
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Some claim sense-data are public, and are parts of objects
[Lacey]
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2775
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It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts
[Dancy,J]
|
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6480
|
Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality
[Robinson,H]
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6482
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For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects
[Robinson,H]
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2713
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Are sense-data independent, with identity, substance and location?
[Tye]
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