more on this theme     |     more from this text

Single Idea 2779

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification ]

Full Idea

An idealist should perhaps be a coherentist, but there seems to be no reason why the coherentist should be an idealist; the link between the two is all one-way.

Gist of Idea

Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists

Source

Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 9.5)

Book Ref

Dancy,Jonathan: 'Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology' [Blackwell 1985], p.137

A Reaction

I don't see why an idealist shouldn't be a rationalist foundationalist, with a private reality full of certainties founded on simple a priori truths. Personally I'm an empiricist coherentist, this week.

The 57 ideas from Jonathan Dancy

18681 The base for values has grounds, catalysts and intensifiers [Dancy,J, by Orsi]
2744 Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism [Dancy,J]
2743 What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? [Dancy,J]
2745 A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J]
2746 How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J]
2747 Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J]
2749 For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J]
2752 Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J]
2751 Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence [Dancy,J]
2753 Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J]
2754 Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification [Dancy,J]
2756 If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J]
2755 If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J]
2757 The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J]
2758 You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J]
2760 Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications [Dancy,J]
2761 If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language? [Dancy,J]
2763 There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs [Dancy,J]
2762 Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours [Dancy,J]
2765 Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J]
2769 If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J]
2766 Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J]
2768 The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J]
2767 If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J]
2771 Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J]
2770 Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J]
2772 Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J]
2773 Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J]
2775 It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J]
2776 Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J]
2779 Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J]
2777 Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J]
2778 Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J]
2781 Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties [Dancy,J]
2780 Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism [Dancy,J]
2782 We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist [Dancy,J]
5677 Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived [Dancy,J]
5678 Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J]
5681 Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J]
5679 We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J]
5680 For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J]
5682 Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J]
5683 Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG]
5684 Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences [Dancy,J]
2784 Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J]
2785 Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J]
2786 For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J]
2788 If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J]
2787 Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J]
2790 I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J]
2791 Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J]
2794 Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth [Dancy,J]
2797 As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth [Dancy,J]
7260 If there are intuited moral facts, why should we care about them? [Dancy,J]
7261 Internalists say that moral intuitions are motivating; externalist say a desire is also needed [Dancy,J]
7262 Obviously judging an action as wrong gives us a reason not to do it [Dancy,J]
7265 Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements [Dancy,J]