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Single Idea 2779
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
]
Full Idea
An idealist should perhaps be a coherentist, but there seems to be no reason why the coherentist should be an idealist; the link between the two is all one-way.
Gist of Idea
Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists
Source
Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 9.5)
Book Ref
Dancy,Jonathan: 'Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology' [Blackwell 1985], p.137
A Reaction
I don't see why an idealist shouldn't be a rationalist foundationalist, with a private reality full of certainties founded on simple a priori truths. Personally I'm an empiricist coherentist, this week.
The
57 ideas
from Jonathan Dancy
18681
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The base for values has grounds, catalysts and intensifiers
[Dancy,J, by Orsi]
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2744
|
Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism
[Dancy,J]
|
2743
|
What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument?
[Dancy,J]
|
2745
|
A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it
[Dancy,J]
|
2746
|
How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die?
[Dancy,J]
|
2747
|
Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification
[Dancy,J]
|
2749
|
For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief
[Dancy,J]
|
2752
|
Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification
[Dancy,J]
|
2751
|
Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence
[Dancy,J]
|
2753
|
Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content
[Dancy,J]
|
2755
|
If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue
[Dancy,J]
|
2754
|
Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification
[Dancy,J]
|
2756
|
If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom
[Dancy,J]
|
2757
|
The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone
[Dancy,J]
|
2758
|
You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts
[Dancy,J]
|
2760
|
Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications
[Dancy,J]
|
2761
|
If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language?
[Dancy,J]
|
2763
|
There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs
[Dancy,J]
|
2762
|
Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours
[Dancy,J]
|
2765
|
Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy
[Dancy,J]
|
2769
|
If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one
[Dancy,J]
|
2766
|
Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions
[Dancy,J]
|
2768
|
The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well
[Dancy,J]
|
2767
|
If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction
[Dancy,J]
|
2772
|
Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge
[Dancy,J]
|
2773
|
Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism
[Dancy,J]
|
2771
|
Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress
[Dancy,J]
|
2770
|
Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth
[Dancy,J]
|
2775
|
It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts
[Dancy,J]
|
2776
|
Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals)
[Dancy,J]
|
2777
|
Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future
[Dancy,J]
|
2779
|
Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists
[Dancy,J]
|
2778
|
Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences
[Dancy,J]
|
2782
|
We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist
[Dancy,J]
|
2781
|
Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties
[Dancy,J]
|
2780
|
Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism
[Dancy,J]
|
5677
|
Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived
[Dancy,J]
|
5678
|
Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly
[Dancy,J]
|
5681
|
Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error
[Dancy,J]
|
5679
|
We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like
[Dancy,J]
|
5680
|
For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct
[Dancy,J]
|
5683
|
Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience
[Dancy,J, by PG]
|
5682
|
Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects
[Dancy,J]
|
5684
|
Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences
[Dancy,J]
|
2784
|
Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality
[Dancy,J]
|
2785
|
Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be
[Dancy,J]
|
2786
|
For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things
[Dancy,J]
|
2787
|
Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation
[Dancy,J]
|
2788
|
If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality
[Dancy,J]
|
2790
|
I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5)
[Dancy,J]
|
2791
|
Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience
[Dancy,J]
|
2794
|
Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth
[Dancy,J]
|
2797
|
As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth
[Dancy,J]
|
7260
|
If there are intuited moral facts, why should we care about them?
[Dancy,J]
|
7261
|
Internalists say that moral intuitions are motivating; externalist say a desire is also needed
[Dancy,J]
|
7262
|
Obviously judging an action as wrong gives us a reason not to do it
[Dancy,J]
|
7265
|
Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements
[Dancy,J]
|