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Single Idea 2788
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
]
Full Idea
If perception is indirect as well as memory, this means there are two direct objects of awareness between the remembering mind and the original object.
Gist of Idea
If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality
Source
Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 12.2)
Book Ref
Dancy,Jonathan: 'Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology' [Blackwell 1985], p.184
The
52 ideas
from 'Intro to Contemporary Epistemology'
2744
|
Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism
[Dancy,J]
|
2743
|
What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument?
[Dancy,J]
|
2745
|
A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it
[Dancy,J]
|
2746
|
How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die?
[Dancy,J]
|
2747
|
Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification
[Dancy,J]
|
2749
|
For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief
[Dancy,J]
|
2752
|
Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification
[Dancy,J]
|
2751
|
Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence
[Dancy,J]
|
2753
|
Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content
[Dancy,J]
|
2754
|
Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification
[Dancy,J]
|
2755
|
If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue
[Dancy,J]
|
2756
|
If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom
[Dancy,J]
|
2757
|
The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone
[Dancy,J]
|
2758
|
You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts
[Dancy,J]
|
2760
|
Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications
[Dancy,J]
|
2761
|
If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language?
[Dancy,J]
|
2763
|
There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs
[Dancy,J]
|
2762
|
Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours
[Dancy,J]
|
2765
|
Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy
[Dancy,J]
|
2769
|
If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one
[Dancy,J]
|
2766
|
Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions
[Dancy,J]
|
2768
|
The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well
[Dancy,J]
|
2767
|
If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction
[Dancy,J]
|
2771
|
Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress
[Dancy,J]
|
2773
|
Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism
[Dancy,J]
|
2770
|
Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth
[Dancy,J]
|
2772
|
Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge
[Dancy,J]
|
2775
|
It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts
[Dancy,J]
|
2776
|
Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals)
[Dancy,J]
|
2779
|
Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists
[Dancy,J]
|
2778
|
Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences
[Dancy,J]
|
2777
|
Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future
[Dancy,J]
|
2780
|
Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism
[Dancy,J]
|
2781
|
Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties
[Dancy,J]
|
2782
|
We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist
[Dancy,J]
|
5677
|
Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived
[Dancy,J]
|
5678
|
Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly
[Dancy,J]
|
5681
|
Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error
[Dancy,J]
|
5680
|
For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct
[Dancy,J]
|
5679
|
We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like
[Dancy,J]
|
5683
|
Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience
[Dancy,J, by PG]
|
5682
|
Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects
[Dancy,J]
|
5684
|
Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences
[Dancy,J]
|
2784
|
Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality
[Dancy,J]
|
2785
|
Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be
[Dancy,J]
|
2786
|
For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things
[Dancy,J]
|
2787
|
Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation
[Dancy,J]
|
2788
|
If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality
[Dancy,J]
|
2790
|
I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5)
[Dancy,J]
|
2791
|
Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience
[Dancy,J]
|
2794
|
Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth
[Dancy,J]
|
2797
|
As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth
[Dancy,J]
|