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Single Idea 2798
[filed under theme 14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
]
Full Idea
Bayesianism says ideally rational people should have degrees of belief (not all-or-nothing beliefs), corresponding with probability theory. Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) X prob(E given H) / prob(E).
Gist of Idea
Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E)
Source
Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.41)
Book Ref
'A Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Dancy,J. /Sosa,E. [Blackwell 1993], p.41
The
23 ideas
from Paul Horwich
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2798
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Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E)
[Horwich]
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2799
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Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence
[Horwich]
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8432
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Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around
[Horwich]
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8431
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Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis
[Horwich]
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9339
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A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds
[Horwich]
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9341
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Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable
[Horwich]
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9342
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Understanding needs a priori commitment
[Horwich]
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9331
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How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition?
[Horwich]
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9333
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A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge
[Horwich]
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9332
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Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around
[Horwich]
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9334
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If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle
[Horwich]
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23299
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Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences
[Horwich, by Davidson]
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6332
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The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily
[Horwich]
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6336
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No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth
[Horwich]
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6337
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The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory
[Horwich]
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6334
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The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth?
[Horwich]
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6335
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The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p
[Horwich]
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6338
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We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning
[Horwich]
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6339
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Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments
[Horwich]
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6340
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There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture
[Horwich]
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6341
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Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage
[Horwich]
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6342
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Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction
[Horwich]
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6344
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Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them
[Horwich]
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