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Full Idea
Critics of emotivism claim that moral agreement need not track agreement in attitude; moralists with the same attitude can disagree in their views, and they can hold the same view while disagreeing in attitude.
Gist of Idea
Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement
Source
David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224)
Book Ref
'Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy', ed/tr. Audi,Robert [CUP 1995], p.224
A Reaction
Thus two racists can disagree about how racists should behave. Sounds like a good criticism.
| 2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink] |
| 2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink] |
| 2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink] |
| 2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink] |
| 2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink] |
| 2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink] |