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Full Idea
Emotivism suggests that different feelings lead to different individual meanings for moral terms, but critics say that meanings are the same, and disagreement is about the extension (range of reference) of the terms.
Gist of Idea
Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference
Source
David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224)
Book Ref
'Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy', ed/tr. Audi,Robert [CUP 1995], p.224
A Reaction
It's hard to see how 'ought to p' could have quite different meanings for an emotivist and (say) a theistic moralist. 'Ought' is an obvious and simple word. Good criticism.
| 2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink] |
| 2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink] |
| 2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink] |
| 2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink] |
| 2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink] |
| 2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink] |