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Single Idea 2940
[filed under theme 16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
]
Full Idea
The subject does not belong to the world; rather, it is a limit of the world.
Gist of Idea
The subject stands outside our understanding of the world
Source
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.632)
Book Ref
Wittgenstein,Ludwig: 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Pears)', ed/tr. Pears,D. /McGuinness,B. [RKP 1961], p.57
A Reaction
Interesting. We must not confuse epistemology with ontology, but the perceived world exists between two limits - the farthest reaches of my perceptions, and the farthest reaches of myself. I wish I could clearly disentangle the nearer border. Dasein?
The
20 ideas
with the same theme
[Self can be inferred to exist, rather than experienced]:
22528
|
The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it
[Aristotle]
|
21317
|
Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person
[Butler]
|
9751
|
To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena
[Kant, by Korsgaard]
|
21450
|
Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it
[Kant]
|
22060
|
The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge
[Fichte, by Siep]
|
22066
|
Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal
[Novalis on Fichte]
|
22016
|
The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity
[Fichte, by Pinkard]
|
23243
|
Consciousness of external things is always accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of self
[Fichte]
|
22073
|
The basis of philosophy is the Self prior to experience, where it is the essence of freedom
[Schelling]
|
21225
|
The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction
[Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
|
22323
|
The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world
[Wittgenstein]
|
2940
|
The subject stands outside our understanding of the world
[Wittgenstein]
|
7109
|
If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally
[Sartre]
|
3827
|
The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced
[Searle]
|
3285
|
We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it
[Nagel]
|
3293
|
If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me
[Nagel]
|
3244
|
Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori
[Nagel]
|
3245
|
The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity
[Nagel]
|
7385
|
People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing
[Dennett]
|
19650
|
The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible
[Meillassoux]
|