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Full Idea
In contrast with Brentano and Husserl, consciousness or attention are no longer seen as essential to intentionality.
Gist of Idea
Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality
Source
William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], Intro)
Book Ref
Lyons,William: 'Approaches to Intentionality' [OUP 1998], p.4
A Reaction
This strikes me as being correct, although there seem to be plenty of current philosophers who do not accept it (e.g. Searle). I think philosophy of mind may be stuck in the dark ages if thinkers don't accept this proposal.
Related Idea
Idea 3481 Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle]
2978 | Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons] |
2979 | Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons] |
2977 | All thinking has content [Lyons] |
2986 | Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons] |
2987 | Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons] |
2984 | Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons] |