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Full Idea
How else, other than via some form of representational system, could a human organism contain information as a content over which it could operate or 'attitudinise'?
Gist of Idea
Propositional attitudes require representation
Source
William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], Intro)
Book Ref
Lyons,William: 'Approaches to Intentionality' [OUP 1998], p.4
A Reaction
Depends what you mean by 'representational'. In its vaguest sense, this is just a tautology - content must be held in the mind in some form or other, but that tells us nothing.
| 5686 | In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes] |
| 3411 | How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim] |
| 18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
| 2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
| 3139 | Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred) [Rey] |
| 2979 | Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons] |
| 21631 | To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson] |
| 18020 | Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances [Magidor] |