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Single Idea 2983
[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
]
Full Idea
Fodor is concerned with producing a realist and physicalist account of 'narrow content' (i.e. wholly in-the-head content).
Gist of Idea
Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so
Source
comment on Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by William Lyons - Approaches to Intentionality p.54
Book Ref
Lyons,William: 'Approaches to Intentionality' [OUP 1998], p.54
A Reaction
The emergence of 'wide' content has rather shaken Fodor's game plan. We can say "Oh dear, I thought I was referring to H2O", so there must be at least some narrow aspect to reference.
The
26 ideas
with the same theme
[how minds internally represent reality]:
21541
|
The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object
[Russell]
|
6164
|
Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features
[Sartre, by Rowlands]
|
3492
|
Content is much more than just sentence meaning
[Searle]
|
6977
|
Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so
[Jackson]
|
4889
|
Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change
[Perry]
|
23794
|
Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual
[Evans, by Schulte]
|
23803
|
States have content if we can predict them well by assuming intentionality
[Dennett, by Schulte]
|
3708
|
All thought represents either properties or indexicals
[Bonjour]
|
2983
|
Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so
[Lyons on Fodor]
|
3115
|
Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing?
[Burge, by Segal]
|
3147
|
Problem-solving clearly involves manipulating images
[Rey]
|
3175
|
Animals map things over time as well as over space
[Rey]
|
2977
|
All thinking has content
[Lyons]
|
15588
|
You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved
[Fine,K]
|
6636
|
The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory
[Lowe]
|
6168
|
The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence
[Rowlands]
|
7637
|
Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts
[Maund, by PG]
|
16381
|
The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers)
[Recanati]
|
18035
|
Two sentences with different meanings can, on occasion, have the same content
[Magidor]
|
19264
|
Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental
[Vaidya]
|
23806
|
Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science
[Schulte]
|
23792
|
Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united
[Schulte]
|
23793
|
On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow
[Schulte]
|
23795
|
Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions
[Schulte]
|
23796
|
Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented
[Schulte]
|
23804
|
Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties
[Schulte]
|