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Full Idea
Fodor is concerned with producing a realist and physicalist account of 'narrow content' (i.e. wholly in-the-head content).
Gist of Idea
Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so
Source
comment on Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by William Lyons - Approaches to Intentionality p.54
Book Ref
Lyons,William: 'Approaches to Intentionality' [OUP 1998], p.54
A Reaction
The emergence of 'wide' content has rather shaken Fodor's game plan. We can say "Oh dear, I thought I was referring to H2O", so there must be at least some narrow aspect to reference.
| 2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
| 15473 | How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB] |
| 2981 | Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor] |
| 3135 | Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey] |
| 2983 | Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor] |