more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 2985
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
]
Full Idea
Fodor holds that beliefs are brain states or processes, but picked out at a 'higher' or 'special science' level.
Gist of Idea
Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"?
Source
comment on Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by William Lyons - Approaches to Intentionality p.82
Book Ref
Lyons,William: 'Approaches to Intentionality' [OUP 1998], p.82
A Reaction
I don't think you can argue with this. Levels of physical description exist (e.g. pure physics tells you nothing about the weather), and I think 'process' is the best word for the mind (Idea 4931).
Related Idea
Idea 4931
Consciousness is a process (of neural interactions), not a location, thing, property, connectivity, or activity [Edelman/Tononi]
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[mind is a non-reducible physical property]:
|
5779
|
There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws
[Russell]
|
|
2587
|
Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts
[Putnam]
|
|
3405
|
If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
|
3966
|
The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism
[Davidson]
|
|
3453
|
Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism
[Searle]
|
|
3455
|
Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling
[Searle]
|
|
3456
|
Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property
[Searle]
|
|
3475
|
Property dualism denies reductionism
[Searle]
|
|
3376
|
We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties
[Kim]
|
|
3424
|
Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists
[Kim]
|
|
2489
|
Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers
[Fodor]
|
|
2985
|
Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"?
[Lyons on Fodor]
|
|
4070
|
Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance
[Crane]
|
|
2406
|
H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that
[Chalmers]
|
|
4593
|
'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties
[Heil]
|
|
6622
|
Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain
[Lowe]
|
|
3520
|
Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical
[Maslin]
|