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Full Idea
Fodor holds that beliefs are brain states or processes, but picked out at a 'higher' or 'special science' level.
Gist of Idea
Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"?
Source
comment on Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by William Lyons - Approaches to Intentionality p.82
Book Ref
Lyons,William: 'Approaches to Intentionality' [OUP 1998], p.82
A Reaction
I don't think you can argue with this. Levels of physical description exist (e.g. pure physics tells you nothing about the weather), and I think 'process' is the best word for the mind (Idea 4931).
Related Idea
Idea 4931 Consciousness is a process (of neural interactions), not a location, thing, property, connectivity, or activity [Edelman/Tononi]
2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
15473 | How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB] |
2981 | Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor] |
3135 | Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey] |
2983 | Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor] |