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Full Idea
In the Representation Theory of Mind, programs (the 'laws of thought') may be explicitly represented, but data structures (the 'contents of thought') have to be.
Gist of Idea
In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 25)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'Psychosemantics' [MIT 1993], p.25
A Reaction
Presumably this is because content is where mental events actually meet up with the reality being considered. It may be an abstract procedure, but if it doesn't plug into reality then it isn't thought, but merely activity, like that of the liver.
| 2096 | Is the function of the mind management, authority and planning - or is it one's whole way of life? [Plato] |
| 4608 | Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil] |
| 2443 | I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor] |
| 2994 | In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor] |
| 7852 | The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau] |
| 3136 | The three theories are reduction, dualism, eliminativism [Rey] |
| 4610 | Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought [Heil] |
| 2537 | Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon] |
| 2534 | Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon] |
| 6617 | The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe] |