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Full Idea
The identity of the content of mental states does not ensure the identity of their extensions.
Gist of Idea
Mental states may have the same content but different extensions
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 45)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'Psychosemantics' [MIT 1993], p.45
A Reaction
Obviously if I am thinking each day about 'my sheep', that won't change if I am unaware that one of them died this morning. …Because I didn’t have the precise number of sheep in mind.
| 9009 | Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth [Quine] |
| 7317 | 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A] |
| 7319 | If we give up synonymy, we have to give up significance, meaning and sense [Grice/Strawson] |
| 3090 | There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman] |
| 11967 | Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan] |
| 2996 | Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor] |
| 20300 | Externalist synonymy is there being a correct link to the same external phenomena [Rey] |
| 9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |