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Single Idea 3001
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
]
Full Idea
Behaviourists had trouble providing a robust construal of mental causation (and hence had no logical space for a psychology of mental processes).
Clarification
A 'contrual' is an explanation
Gist of Idea
Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 67)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'Psychosemantics' [MIT 1993], p.67
A Reaction
If they could reduce all mental events to stimulus-response, that seems to fall within the normal procedures of physical causation. There is no problem of mental causation if your ontology is entirely physical.
The
27 ideas
from 'Psychosemantics'
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5498
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Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents
[Fodor, by Lycan]
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7326
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Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things
[Fodor]
|
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7014
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A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties
[Fodor]
|
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15494
|
We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining
[Fodor]
|
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2990
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Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned
[Fodor]
|
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2991
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Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought
[Fodor]
|
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2992
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We may be able to explain rationality mechanically
[Fodor]
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2993
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Any piece of software can always be hard-wired
[Fodor]
|
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2994
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In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be
[Fodor]
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2995
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Supervenience gives good support for mental causation
[Fodor]
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2996
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Mental states may have the same content but different extensions
[Fodor]
|
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2998
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Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express
[Fodor]
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2999
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Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism
[Fodor]
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3000
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Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine
[Fodor]
|
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3002
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If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought?
[Fodor]
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3001
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Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation
[Fodor]
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3003
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Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role
[Fodor]
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3004
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The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude
[Fodor]
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3005
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'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties
[Fodor]
|
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3006
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Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth
[Fodor]
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3007
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Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value
[Fodor]
|
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3008
|
Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial
[Fodor]
|
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3009
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Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals
[Fodor]
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3010
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Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese
[Fodor]
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3011
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Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states
[Fodor]
|
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3012
|
Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles?
[Fodor]
|
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2988
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Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have
[Fodor]
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