more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 3003
[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
]
Full Idea
It's an embarrassment for attempts to construct content from functional role that quite different sorts of mental states can nevertheless share their contents.
Gist of Idea
Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 70)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'Psychosemantics' [MIT 1993], p.70
A Reaction
That is, presumably, one content having two different roles. Two contents with the same role is 'multiple realisability'. Pain can tell me I'm damaged, or reveal that my damaged nerves are healing. Problem?
The
27 ideas
from 'Psychosemantics'
|
5498
|
Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents
[Fodor, by Lycan]
|
|
7326
|
Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things
[Fodor]
|
|
7014
|
A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties
[Fodor]
|
|
15494
|
We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining
[Fodor]
|
|
2990
|
Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned
[Fodor]
|
|
2991
|
Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought
[Fodor]
|
|
2992
|
We may be able to explain rationality mechanically
[Fodor]
|
|
2993
|
Any piece of software can always be hard-wired
[Fodor]
|
|
2994
|
In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be
[Fodor]
|
|
2995
|
Supervenience gives good support for mental causation
[Fodor]
|
|
2996
|
Mental states may have the same content but different extensions
[Fodor]
|
|
2998
|
Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express
[Fodor]
|
|
2999
|
Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism
[Fodor]
|
|
3000
|
Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine
[Fodor]
|
|
3002
|
If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought?
[Fodor]
|
|
3001
|
Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation
[Fodor]
|
|
3003
|
Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role
[Fodor]
|
|
3004
|
The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude
[Fodor]
|
|
3005
|
'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties
[Fodor]
|
|
3006
|
Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth
[Fodor]
|
|
3007
|
Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value
[Fodor]
|
|
3008
|
Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial
[Fodor]
|
|
3009
|
Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals
[Fodor]
|
|
3010
|
Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese
[Fodor]
|
|
3011
|
Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states
[Fodor]
|
|
3012
|
Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles?
[Fodor]
|
|
2988
|
Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have
[Fodor]
|