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Single Idea 3104

[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content ]

Full Idea

Is a relationship with diamonds necessary for having a concept of diamonds?

Gist of Idea

Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them?

Source

Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 1.4)

Book Ref

Segal,Gabriel M.A.: 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content' [MIT 2000], p.10

A Reaction

Probably not, given that I have a concept of kryptonite, and that I can invent my own concepts. Suppose I was brought up to believe that diamonds are a myth?

The 39 ideas with the same theme [meanings aren't in the head ('Externalism')]:

12995 The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz]
12807 The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz]
7531 We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell]
7055 Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Heil]
4138 Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? [Wittgenstein]
9168 I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam]
5820 'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam]
7612 Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam]
8872 It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson]
8874 It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson]
6175 External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands]
3974 Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
3464 There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle]
3416 Content may match several things in the environment [Kim]
3418 'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim]
3421 Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim]
16428 Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
16474 How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker]
3998 If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis]
3997 Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis]
3999 A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis]
4000 Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis]
2441 Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor]
3982 How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor]
7884 Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau]
7863 If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions? [Papineau]
8248 Phenomenology says thought is part of the world [Deleuze/Guattari]
3207 Simple externalism is that the meaning just is the object [Rey]
4067 Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane]
7058 Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil]
4922 Consciousness involves interaction with persons and the world, as well as brain functions [Edelman/Tononi]
3758 Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske]
3104 Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
3103 Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
3109 If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
3111 Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
3116 Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
3117 Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
19300 The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale]