more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 3106

[filed under theme 10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible ]

Full Idea

Since conceivability is the chief method of assessing the claims of metaphysical necessity, I think such claims are incautious.

Gist of Idea

If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious

Source

Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 1.6)

Book Ref

Segal,Gabriel M.A.: 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content' [MIT 2000], p.16


The 10 ideas with the same theme [seems conceivable when not actually possible]:

Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld on Descartes]
We can imagine a point swelling and contracting - but not how this could be done [Hobbes]
Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
It is possible to conceive what is not possible [Shoemaker]
If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden]
The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague [Lewis]
One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers]
If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi]
Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter]