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Full Idea
Since conceivability is the chief method of assessing the claims of metaphysical necessity, I think such claims are incautious.
Gist of Idea
If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious
Source
Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 1.6)
Book Ref
Segal,Gabriel M.A.: 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content' [MIT 2000], p.16
3642 | Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld on Descartes] |
16582 | We can imagine a point swelling and contracting - but not how this could be done [Hobbes] |
11958 | Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar] |
8562 | It is possible to conceive what is not possible [Shoemaker] |
15252 | If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden] |
9660 | The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague [Lewis] |
2407 | One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers] |
3106 | If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal] |
10652 | Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi] |
14714 | Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter] |