more from this thinker     |     more from this text

Single Idea 3109

[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content ]

Full Idea

If we accept Putnam's externalist conclusion about the meaning of a word, it is a short step to a similar conclusion about the contents of the twins' beliefs, desires and so on.

Gist of Idea

If content is external, so are beliefs and desires

Source

Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 2.1)

Book Ref

Segal,Gabriel M.A.: 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content' [MIT 2000], p.24

A Reaction

This is the key step which has launched a whole new externalist view of the nature of the mind. It is one thing to say that I don't quite know what my words mean, another that I don't know my own beliefs.

The 39 ideas with the same theme [meanings aren't in the head ('Externalism')]:

12995 The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz]
12807 The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz]
7531 We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell]
7055 Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Heil]
4138 Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? [Wittgenstein]
9168 I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam]
5820 'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam]
7612 Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam]
8872 It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson]
8874 It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson]
6175 External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands]
3974 Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
3464 There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle]
3416 Content may match several things in the environment [Kim]
3418 'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim]
3421 Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim]
16428 Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
16474 How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker]
3998 If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis]
3997 Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis]
3999 A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis]
4000 Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis]
2441 Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor]
3982 How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor]
7884 Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau]
7863 If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions? [Papineau]
8248 Phenomenology says thought is part of the world [Deleuze/Guattari]
3207 Simple externalism is that the meaning just is the object [Rey]
4067 Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane]
7058 Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil]
4922 Consciousness involves interaction with persons and the world, as well as brain functions [Edelman/Tononi]
3758 Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske]
3104 Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
3103 Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
3109 If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
3111 Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
3116 Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
3117 Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
19300 The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale]