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Single Idea 3109

[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content ]

Full Idea

If we accept Putnam's externalist conclusion about the meaning of a word, it is a short step to a similar conclusion about the contents of the twins' beliefs, desires and so on.

Gist of Idea

If content is external, so are beliefs and desires

Source

Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 2.1)

Book Ref

Segal,Gabriel M.A.: 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content' [MIT 2000], p.24


A Reaction

This is the key step which has launched a whole new externalist view of the nature of the mind. It is one thing to say that I don't quite know what my words mean, another that I don't know my own beliefs.


The 18 ideas from 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content'

Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]