more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 3112
[filed under theme 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
]
Full Idea
Commonsense psychology is a powerful explanatory theory, and largely correct, but it seems to be profoundly dualist, and treats minds as immaterial spirits which can transmigrate and exist disembodied.
Gist of Idea
Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions
Source
Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 2.2)
Book Ref
Segal,Gabriel M.A.: 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content' [MIT 2000], p.37
A Reaction
Fans of folk psychology tend to focus on central normal experience, but folk psychology also seems to range from quirky to barking mad. A 'premonition' is a widely accepted mental event.
The
18 ideas
from Gabriel M.A. Segal
3104
|
Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them?
[Segal]
|
3103
|
Maybe content involves relations to a language community
[Segal]
|
3105
|
Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary?
[Segal]
|
3106
|
If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious
[Segal]
|
3108
|
If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ
[Segal]
|
3110
|
Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible
[Segal]
|
3109
|
If content is external, so are beliefs and desires
[Segal]
|
3111
|
Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference
[Segal]
|
3113
|
The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth
[Segal]
|
3112
|
Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions
[Segal]
|
3116
|
Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users
[Segal]
|
3117
|
Concepts can survive a big change in extension
[Segal]
|
3118
|
If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things
[Segal]
|
3119
|
Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms
[Segal]
|
3121
|
If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts
[Segal]
|
3123
|
Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints
[Segal]
|
3124
|
Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds
[Segal]
|
3125
|
Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality
[Segal]
|