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Single Idea 3114
[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
]
Full Idea
If the words of 'Swamp Man' (spontaneously created, with concepts) are about XYZ on Twin Earth, it is not because he's causally connected to the stuff, but because XYZ would cause his 'water' tokens (in the absence of H2O).
Gist of Idea
Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], App B)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'The Elm and the Expert' [MIT 1995], p.118
A Reaction
The sight of the Eiffel tower causes my 'France' tokens, so is my word "France" about the Eiffel Tower? What would cause my 'nothing' tokens?
The
30 ideas
from 'The Elm and the Expert'
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2432
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Is content basically information, fixed externally?
[Fodor]
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2433
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For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning
[Fodor]
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2434
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Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation
[Fodor]
|
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2435
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Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving
[Fodor]
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2436
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It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth)
[Fodor]
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2438
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In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions
[Fodor]
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2439
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Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences
[Fodor]
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2437
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XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility
[Fodor]
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2440
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Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way
[Fodor]
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2441
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Truth conditions require a broad concept of content
[Fodor]
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2442
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Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world
[Fodor]
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2458
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Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs
[Fodor]
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2446
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Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle
[Fodor]
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2459
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Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is
[Fodor]
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2451
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To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true
[Fodor]
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2463
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A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality
[Fodor]
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2447
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Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind
[Fodor]
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2461
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An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time
[Fodor]
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2457
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If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs
[Fodor]
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2462
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Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs
[Fodor]
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2454
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We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments
[Fodor]
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2455
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Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused
[Fodor]
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2460
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Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean
[Fodor]
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2443
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I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation
[Fodor]
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2453
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We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts
[Fodor]
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2445
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Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again
[Fodor]
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2450
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Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment
[Fodor]
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2452
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Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content
[Fodor]
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2464
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Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds
[Fodor]
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3114
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Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff
[Fodor]
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