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Single Idea 3116

[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content ]

Full Idea

Putnam and Burge claim that there could be two words that a misinformed subject uses to express different concepts, but that express just one concept of the experts.

Gist of Idea

Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users

Source

Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 3.2)

Book Ref

Segal,Gabriel M.A.: 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content' [MIT 2000], p.73


A Reaction

This pushes the concept outside the mind of the user, which leaves an ontological problem of what concepts are made of, how you individuate them, and where they are located.


The 18 ideas from 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content'

Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]