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Single Idea 3117

[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content ]

Full Idea

We need to think of concepts as organic entities that can persist through changes of extension.

Gist of Idea

Concepts can survive a big change in extension

Source

Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 3.3)

Book Ref

Segal,Gabriel M.A.: 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content' [MIT 2000], p.77


A Reaction

This would be 'organic' in the sense of modifying and growing. This is exactly right, and the interesting problem becomes the extreme cases, where an individual stretches a concept a long way.


The 18 ideas from 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content'

Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]