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Single Idea 3117
[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
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Full Idea
We need to think of concepts as organic entities that can persist through changes of extension.
Gist of Idea
Concepts can survive a big change in extension
Source
Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 3.3)
Book Ref
Segal,Gabriel M.A.: 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content' [MIT 2000], p.77
A Reaction
This would be 'organic' in the sense of modifying and growing. This is exactly right, and the interesting problem becomes the extreme cases, where an individual stretches a concept a long way.
The
18 ideas
from 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content'
3104
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Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them?
[Segal]
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3103
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Maybe content involves relations to a language community
[Segal]
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3105
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Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary?
[Segal]
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3106
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If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious
[Segal]
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3108
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If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ
[Segal]
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3110
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Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible
[Segal]
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3109
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If content is external, so are beliefs and desires
[Segal]
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3111
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Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference
[Segal]
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3113
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The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth
[Segal]
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3112
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Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions
[Segal]
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3116
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Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users
[Segal]
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3117
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Concepts can survive a big change in extension
[Segal]
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3118
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If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things
[Segal]
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3119
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Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms
[Segal]
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3121
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If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts
[Segal]
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3123
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Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints
[Segal]
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3124
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Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds
[Segal]
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3125
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Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality
[Segal]
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