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Single Idea 3118
[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
]
Full Idea
If we identify a psychological property with its causal role then we lose the obvious explanation of why the event has the causal role that it has.
Gist of Idea
If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things
Source
Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 4.1)
Book Ref
Segal,Gabriel M.A.: 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content' [MIT 2000], p.95
A Reaction
This pinpoints very nicely one of the biggest errors in modern philosophy. There are good naturalistic reasons to reduce everything to causal role, but there is a deeper layer. Essences!
The
18 ideas
from 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content'
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3104
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Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them?
[Segal]
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3103
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Maybe content involves relations to a language community
[Segal]
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3105
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Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary?
[Segal]
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3106
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If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious
[Segal]
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3108
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If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ
[Segal]
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3110
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Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible
[Segal]
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3109
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If content is external, so are beliefs and desires
[Segal]
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3111
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Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference
[Segal]
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3113
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The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth
[Segal]
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3112
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Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions
[Segal]
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3116
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Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users
[Segal]
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3117
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Concepts can survive a big change in extension
[Segal]
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3118
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If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things
[Segal]
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3119
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Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms
[Segal]
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3121
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If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts
[Segal]
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3123
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Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints
[Segal]
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3124
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Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds
[Segal]
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3125
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Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality
[Segal]
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