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Single Idea 3123
[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
]
Full Idea
Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints.
Gist of Idea
Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints
Source
Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 5)
Book Ref
Segal,Gabriel M.A.: 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content' [MIT 2000], p.127
Related Ideas
Idea 7953
Reasoning needs to cut nature accurately at the joints [Plato]
Idea 13775
We only succeed in cutting if we use appropriate tools, not if we approach it randomly [Plato]
The
18 ideas
from Gabriel M.A. Segal
3103
|
Maybe content involves relations to a language community
[Segal]
|
3104
|
Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them?
[Segal]
|
3105
|
Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary?
[Segal]
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3106
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If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious
[Segal]
|
3108
|
If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ
[Segal]
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3110
|
Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible
[Segal]
|
3109
|
If content is external, so are beliefs and desires
[Segal]
|
3111
|
Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference
[Segal]
|
3113
|
The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth
[Segal]
|
3112
|
Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions
[Segal]
|
3116
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Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users
[Segal]
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3117
|
Concepts can survive a big change in extension
[Segal]
|
3118
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If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things
[Segal]
|
3119
|
Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms
[Segal]
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3121
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If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts
[Segal]
|
3123
|
Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints
[Segal]
|
3124
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Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds
[Segal]
|
3125
|
Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality
[Segal]
|