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Single Idea 3131
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
]
Full Idea
Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism.
Gist of Idea
Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism
Source
report of Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind Int.3
Book Ref
Rey,Georges: 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind' [Blackwell 1997], p.7
The
19 ideas
with the same theme
[there is no such thing as mind, only the brain]:
5997
|
Dicaearchus said soul does not exist, but is just a configuration of the body
[Dicaearchus, by Fortenbaugh]
|
9285
|
'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul'
[James]
|
3131
|
Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism
[Quine, by Rey]
|
2344
|
If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic
[Putnam]
|
5800
|
All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions
[Dretske]
|
3377
|
Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation
[Kim]
|
7366
|
It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious
[Dennett]
|
7380
|
Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing
[Dennett]
|
4988
|
Folk psychology may not be reducible, but that doesn't make it false
[Kirk,R on Churchland,PM]
|
4987
|
Eliminative materialism says folk psychology will be replaced, not reduced
[Churchland,PM]
|
4876
|
Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind
[Dennett]
|
7656
|
I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is
[Dennett]
|
4984
|
All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics
[Kirk,R]
|
2954
|
Identity theory likes the identity of lightning and electrical discharges
[Lockwood]
|
3140
|
If you explain water as H2O, you have reduced water, but not eliminated it
[Rey]
|
3134
|
Human behaviour can show law-like regularity, which eliminativism can't explain
[Rey]
|
5342
|
Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser
[Flanagan]
|
4609
|
It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs
[Heil]
|
6630
|
Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes
[Lowe]
|