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Full Idea
There are three main views regarding the ontology of mental phenomena: reductionism, dualism and eliminativism.
Clarification
Thoughts are explained as something else, or exist independently, or are non-existent
Gist of Idea
The three theories are reduction, dualism, eliminativism
Source
Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 1.1)
Book Ref
Rey,Georges: 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind' [Blackwell 1997], p.14
A Reaction
It is precisely this picture which is rejected by Davidson and co, who want something called 'property dualism', with a unique relationship which is labelled 'supervenient'. Unfortunately there is no analogy for it. Not even beauty and a statue.
| 2096 | Is the function of the mind management, authority and planning - or is it one's whole way of life? [Plato] |
| 4608 | Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil] |
| 2443 | I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor] |
| 2994 | In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor] |
| 7852 | The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau] |
| 3136 | The three theories are reduction, dualism, eliminativism [Rey] |
| 4610 | Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought [Heil] |
| 2537 | Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon] |
| 2534 | Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon] |
| 6617 | The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe] |