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Full Idea
Propositional attitudes divide into two broad types: neutral informational ones (belief, suspicion, imagining), and directional ones which motivate an agent (preference, desire, hate).
Gist of Idea
Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred)
Source
Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 1.1.2)
Book Ref
Rey,Georges: 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind' [Blackwell 1997], p.19
A Reaction
Since suspicions are motivating, and preferences are informational, this is not a very sharp distinction. An alternative would be to say that there is one type, and sometimes the will gets involved.
| 5686 | In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes] |
| 3411 | How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim] |
| 18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
| 2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
| 3139 | Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred) [Rey] |
| 2979 | Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons] |
| 21631 | To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson] |
| 18020 | Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances [Magidor] |