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Single Idea 3147
[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
]
Full Idea
Recent experiments (Shepard 1982) suggest people have imagistic representations they inspect when solving problems. In comparing two rotated images, the time for comparison varies with the angle of rotation.
Gist of Idea
Problem-solving clearly involves manipulating images
Source
Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 2.5.3)
Book Ref
Rey,Georges: 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind' [Blackwell 1997], p.54
A Reaction
This doesn't prove that they are slowly rotating something. It may just be harder to make the leap to the new shape, when it is 'further away'. Picturing a 20-sided figure, we don't add sides one-by-one.
The
26 ideas
with the same theme
[how minds internally represent reality]:
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21541
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The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object
[Russell]
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6164
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Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features
[Sartre, by Rowlands]
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3492
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Content is much more than just sentence meaning
[Searle]
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6977
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Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so
[Jackson]
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4889
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Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change
[Perry]
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23794
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Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual
[Evans, by Schulte]
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23803
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States have content if we can predict them well by assuming intentionality
[Dennett, by Schulte]
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3708
|
All thought represents either properties or indexicals
[Bonjour]
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2983
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Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so
[Lyons on Fodor]
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3115
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Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing?
[Burge, by Segal]
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3147
|
Problem-solving clearly involves manipulating images
[Rey]
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3175
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Animals map things over time as well as over space
[Rey]
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2977
|
All thinking has content
[Lyons]
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15588
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You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved
[Fine,K]
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6636
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The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory
[Lowe]
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6168
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The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence
[Rowlands]
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7637
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Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts
[Maund, by PG]
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16381
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The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers)
[Recanati]
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18035
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Two sentences with different meanings can, on occasion, have the same content
[Magidor]
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19264
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Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental
[Vaidya]
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23806
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Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science
[Schulte]
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23792
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Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united
[Schulte]
|
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23793
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On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow
[Schulte]
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23796
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Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented
[Schulte]
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23795
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Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions
[Schulte]
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23804
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Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties
[Schulte]
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