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Single Idea 317

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking ]

Full Idea

Our basic description of the universe contained an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it.

Gist of Idea

The universe is basically an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it

Source

Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 48e)

Book Ref

Plato: 'Timaeus and Critias', ed/tr. Lee,Desmond [Penguin 1971], p.67

The 21 ideas with the same theme [how particulars are said to relate to Forms]:

304 Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato]
212 The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
213 Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
215 If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
216 If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
218 Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
1 There is only one source for all beauty [Plato]
368 Other things are named after the Forms because they participate in them [Plato]
4447 If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato]
17 A Form applies to a set of particular things with the same name [Plato]
317 The universe is basically an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it [Plato]
556 If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato]
16110 If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating? [Aristotle]
633 If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them [Aristotle]
643 How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them? [Aristotle]
647 There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular [Aristotle]
2475 Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor]
17946 Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas]
10722 Instantiation is set-membership [Oliver]
6900 A prior understanding of beauty is needed to assert that the Form of the Beautiful is beautiful [Westaway]
7964 How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C]