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Single Idea 3174
[filed under theme 18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
]
Full Idea
Grammatical sensitivity is in no way a physical property of the stimulus, and we can't imagine how to build a device which would produce grammatical structures in response to the environment.
Gist of Idea
Good grammar can't come simply from stimuli
Source
Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 4.3)
Book Ref
Rey,Georges: 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind' [Blackwell 1997], p.126
A Reaction
You could try to program it with a set of (say) Aristotelian categories, and mechanisms to sort the environment accordingly. It then has to query its database, in response to practical needs. A doddle.
The
60 ideas
from 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind'
3136
|
The three theories are reduction, dualism, eliminativism
[Rey]
|
3137
|
Varieties of singular terms are used to designate token particulars
[Rey]
|
3138
|
Arithmetic and unconscious attitudes have no qualia
[Rey]
|
3139
|
Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred)
[Rey]
|
3140
|
If you explain water as H2O, you have reduced water, but not eliminated it
[Rey]
|
3213
|
Animals may also use a language of thought
[Rey]
|
3215
|
Images can't replace computation, as they need it
[Rey]
|
3216
|
Is the room functionally the same as a Chinese speaker?
[Rey]
|
3220
|
Searle is guilty of the fallacy of division - attributing a property of the whole to a part
[Rey]
|
3221
|
Our desires become important when we have desires about desires
[Rey]
|
3223
|
Self-consciousness may just be nested intentionality
[Rey]
|
3224
|
If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental
[Rey]
|
3227
|
Are qualia a type of propositional attitude?
[Rey]
|
3226
|
Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind?
[Rey]
|
3229
|
If colour fits a cone mapping hue, brightness and saturation, rotating the cone could give spectrum inversion
[Rey]
|
3141
|
Is consciousness 40Hz oscillations in layers 5 and 6 of the visual cortex?
[Rey]
|
3142
|
Why qualia, and why this particular quale?
[Rey]
|
3143
|
Physics requires the existence of properties, and also the abstract objects of arithmetic
[Rey]
|
3145
|
The Indiscernibility of Identicals is a truism; but the Identity of Indiscernibles depends on possible identical worlds
[Rey]
|
3147
|
Problem-solving clearly involves manipulating images
[Rey]
|
3148
|
Dualist privacy is seen as too deep for even telepathy to reach
[Rey]
|
3149
|
Referential Opacity says truth is lost when you substitute one referring term ('mother') for another ('Jocasta')
[Rey]
|
3150
|
Can identity explain reason, free will, non-extension, intentionality, subjectivity, experience?
[Rey]
|
3162
|
Experiments prove that people are often unaware of their motives
[Rey]
|
3163
|
Brain damage makes the unreliability of introspection obvious
[Rey]
|
3164
|
Intentional explanations are always circular
[Rey]
|
3165
|
Behaviourism is eliminative, or reductionist, or methodological
[Rey]
|
3166
|
Animal learning is separate from their behaviour
[Rey]
|
3167
|
Animals don't just respond to stimuli, they experiment
[Rey]
|
3170
|
We train children in truth, not in grammar
[Rey]
|
3169
|
A simple chaining device can't build sentences containing 'either..or', or 'if..then'
[Rey]
|
3171
|
Children speak 90% good grammar
[Rey]
|
3175
|
Animals map things over time as well as over space
[Rey]
|
3172
|
Empiricism says experience is both origin and justification of all knowledge
[Rey]
|
3173
|
How are stimuli and responses 'similar'?
[Rey]
|
3176
|
Anything bears a family resemblance to a game, but obviously not anything counts as one
[Rey]
|
3174
|
Good grammar can't come simply from stimuli
[Rey]
|
3179
|
Behaviour is too contingent and irrelevant to be the mind
[Rey]
|
3180
|
Maybe behaviourists should define mental states as a group
[Rey]
|
3181
|
A one hour gap in time might be indirectly verified, but then almost anything could be
[Rey]
|
3186
|
If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind?
[Rey]
|
3188
|
Homuncular functionalism (e.g. Freud) could be based on simpler mechanical processes
[Rey]
|
3194
|
CRTT is good on deduction, but not so hot on induction, abduction and practical reason
[Rey]
|
3196
|
Free will isn't evidence against a theory of thought if there is no evidence for free will
[Rey]
|
3195
|
If reason could be explained in computational terms, there would be no need for the concept of 'free will'
[Rey]
|
3199
|
Connectionism assigns numbers to nodes and branches, and plots the outcomes
[Rey]
|
3201
|
Connectionism explains well speed of perception and 'graceful degradation'
[Rey]
|
3202
|
Connectionism explains irrationality (such as the Gamblers' Fallacy) quite well
[Rey]
|
3200
|
Pattern recognition is puzzling for computation, but makes sense for connectionism
[Rey]
|
3204
|
The meaning of "and" may be its use, but not of "animal"
[Rey]
|
3205
|
Semantic holism means new evidence for a belief changes the belief, and we can't agree on concepts
[Rey]
|
3206
|
One computer program could either play chess or fight a war
[Rey]
|
3207
|
Simple externalism is that the meaning just is the object
[Rey]
|
3209
|
Causal theories of reference (by 'dubbing') don't eliminate meanings in the heads of dubbers
[Rey]
|
3210
|
If meaning and reference are based on causation, then virtually everything has meaning
[Rey]
|
3129
|
Physicalism offers something called "complexity" instead of mental substance
[Rey]
|
3128
|
It's not at all clear that explanation needs to stop anywhere
[Rey]
|
3127
|
Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research
[Rey]
|
3134
|
Human behaviour can show law-like regularity, which eliminativism can't explain
[Rey]
|
3232
|
Abduction could have true data and a false conclusion, and may include data not originally mentioned
[Rey]
|