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Single Idea 3175
[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
]
Full Idea
To map things like food over time, animals must somehow represent events as having temporal properties, and somehow store those representations ready for later use.
Gist of Idea
Animals map things over time as well as over space
Source
Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 4.3)
Book Ref
Rey,Georges: 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind' [Blackwell 1997], p.126
A Reaction
If the mechanisms for doing this are basic, then so is the ontology. Objects must be categorised, properties spotted, time-spans correlated etc. 'Represent' needs to be sharp to be useful.
The
69 ideas
from Georges Rey
3136
|
The three theories are reduction, dualism, eliminativism
[Rey]
|
3137
|
Varieties of singular terms are used to designate token particulars
[Rey]
|
3138
|
Arithmetic and unconscious attitudes have no qualia
[Rey]
|
3139
|
Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred)
[Rey]
|
3140
|
If you explain water as H2O, you have reduced water, but not eliminated it
[Rey]
|
3213
|
Animals may also use a language of thought
[Rey]
|
3215
|
Images can't replace computation, as they need it
[Rey]
|
3216
|
Is the room functionally the same as a Chinese speaker?
[Rey]
|
3220
|
Searle is guilty of the fallacy of division - attributing a property of the whole to a part
[Rey]
|
3221
|
Our desires become important when we have desires about desires
[Rey]
|
3223
|
Self-consciousness may just be nested intentionality
[Rey]
|
3224
|
If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental
[Rey]
|
3227
|
Are qualia a type of propositional attitude?
[Rey]
|
3226
|
Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind?
[Rey]
|
3229
|
If colour fits a cone mapping hue, brightness and saturation, rotating the cone could give spectrum inversion
[Rey]
|
3142
|
Why qualia, and why this particular quale?
[Rey]
|
3141
|
Is consciousness 40Hz oscillations in layers 5 and 6 of the visual cortex?
[Rey]
|
3143
|
Physics requires the existence of properties, and also the abstract objects of arithmetic
[Rey]
|
3145
|
The Indiscernibility of Identicals is a truism; but the Identity of Indiscernibles depends on possible identical worlds
[Rey]
|
3147
|
Problem-solving clearly involves manipulating images
[Rey]
|
3148
|
Dualist privacy is seen as too deep for even telepathy to reach
[Rey]
|
3149
|
Referential Opacity says truth is lost when you substitute one referring term ('mother') for another ('Jocasta')
[Rey]
|
3150
|
Can identity explain reason, free will, non-extension, intentionality, subjectivity, experience?
[Rey]
|
3162
|
Experiments prove that people are often unaware of their motives
[Rey]
|
3163
|
Brain damage makes the unreliability of introspection obvious
[Rey]
|
3164
|
Intentional explanations are always circular
[Rey]
|
3165
|
Behaviourism is eliminative, or reductionist, or methodological
[Rey]
|
3166
|
Animal learning is separate from their behaviour
[Rey]
|
3167
|
Animals don't just respond to stimuli, they experiment
[Rey]
|
3170
|
We train children in truth, not in grammar
[Rey]
|
3169
|
A simple chaining device can't build sentences containing 'either..or', or 'if..then'
[Rey]
|
3171
|
Children speak 90% good grammar
[Rey]
|
3175
|
Animals map things over time as well as over space
[Rey]
|
3172
|
Empiricism says experience is both origin and justification of all knowledge
[Rey]
|
3173
|
How are stimuli and responses 'similar'?
[Rey]
|
3174
|
Good grammar can't come simply from stimuli
[Rey]
|
3176
|
Anything bears a family resemblance to a game, but obviously not anything counts as one
[Rey]
|
3179
|
Behaviour is too contingent and irrelevant to be the mind
[Rey]
|
3180
|
Maybe behaviourists should define mental states as a group
[Rey]
|
3181
|
A one hour gap in time might be indirectly verified, but then almost anything could be
[Rey]
|
3186
|
If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind?
[Rey]
|
3188
|
Homuncular functionalism (e.g. Freud) could be based on simpler mechanical processes
[Rey]
|
3194
|
CRTT is good on deduction, but not so hot on induction, abduction and practical reason
[Rey]
|
3196
|
Free will isn't evidence against a theory of thought if there is no evidence for free will
[Rey]
|
3195
|
If reason could be explained in computational terms, there would be no need for the concept of 'free will'
[Rey]
|
3200
|
Pattern recognition is puzzling for computation, but makes sense for connectionism
[Rey]
|
3199
|
Connectionism assigns numbers to nodes and branches, and plots the outcomes
[Rey]
|
3201
|
Connectionism explains well speed of perception and 'graceful degradation'
[Rey]
|
3202
|
Connectionism explains irrationality (such as the Gamblers' Fallacy) quite well
[Rey]
|
3204
|
The meaning of "and" may be its use, but not of "animal"
[Rey]
|
3205
|
Semantic holism means new evidence for a belief changes the belief, and we can't agree on concepts
[Rey]
|
3206
|
One computer program could either play chess or fight a war
[Rey]
|
3207
|
Simple externalism is that the meaning just is the object
[Rey]
|
3209
|
Causal theories of reference (by 'dubbing') don't eliminate meanings in the heads of dubbers
[Rey]
|
3210
|
If meaning and reference are based on causation, then virtually everything has meaning
[Rey]
|
3129
|
Physicalism offers something called "complexity" instead of mental substance
[Rey]
|
3128
|
It's not at all clear that explanation needs to stop anywhere
[Rey]
|
3127
|
Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research
[Rey]
|
3134
|
Human behaviour can show law-like regularity, which eliminativism can't explain
[Rey]
|
3232
|
Abduction could have true data and a false conclusion, and may include data not originally mentioned
[Rey]
|
20294
|
'Married' does not 'contain' its symmetry, nor 'bigger than' its transitivity
[Rey]
|
20293
|
Analytic judgements can't be explained by contradiction, since that is what is assumed
[Rey]
|
20297
|
Analytic statements are undeniable (because of meaning), rather than unrevisable
[Rey]
|
20298
|
The traditional a priori is justified without experience; post-Quine it became unrevisable by experience
[Rey]
|
20299
|
If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical?
[Rey]
|
20300
|
Externalist synonymy is there being a correct link to the same external phenomena
[Rey]
|
20301
|
The meaning properties of a term are those which explain how the term is typically used
[Rey]
|
20302
|
An intrinsic language faculty may fix what is meaningful (as well as grammatical)
[Rey]
|
20303
|
Research throws doubts on the claimed intuitions which support analyticity
[Rey]
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