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Full Idea
Defining most mental states seems to requiring citing other mental states - but perhaps behaviourists can define them all simultaneously
Gist of Idea
Maybe behaviourists should define mental states as a group
Source
Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 5.3)
Book Ref
Rey,Georges: 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind' [Blackwell 1997], p.154
A Reaction
This is an interesting strategy for trying to avoid the well known circularity of attempting to define mental states in behavioural terms. Behaviourism won't go away.
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 3369 | Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim] |
| 3428 | Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim] |
| 4991 | Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R] |
| 4994 | Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R] |
| 3165 | Behaviourism is eliminative, or reductionist, or methodological [Rey] |
| 3180 | Maybe behaviourists should define mental states as a group [Rey] |