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Single Idea 3185
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
]
Full Idea
The multiple realisability emphasised by functionalists rules out the hidden essences (and the 'deferential' move in semantics) that one finds in the cases, for example, of "water" and "gold" emphasised by Kripke and Putnam.
Gist of Idea
Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts
Source
Colin McGinn (The Problem of Consciousness [1991], p.132)
Book Ref
Rey,Georges: 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind' [Blackwell 1997], p.188
A Reaction
Presumably if they are 'hidden', then the people to whom we 'defer' for our concepts can't actually know about the essences we are supposed to be discussing. You can mean essences without knowing them. Cf. Loch Ness Monster.
The
74 ideas
from Colin McGinn
6042
|
The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool
[McGinn]
|
6051
|
In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements
[McGinn]
|
6055
|
Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation
[McGinn]
|
6059
|
Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation
[McGinn]
|
6050
|
Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity
[McGinn]
|
6052
|
Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity
[McGinn]
|
6049
|
Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py'
[McGinn]
|
6043
|
Type-identity is close similarity in qualities
[McGinn]
|
6058
|
Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role
[McGinn]
|
6053
|
Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be
[McGinn]
|
6054
|
Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical
[McGinn]
|
6044
|
Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties
[McGinn]
|
6046
|
Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved
[McGinn]
|
6045
|
It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance'
[McGinn]
|
6047
|
All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true
[McGinn]
|
6048
|
Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity
[McGinn]
|
6062
|
Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence
[McGinn]
|
6065
|
We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties
[McGinn]
|
6067
|
Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists'
[McGinn]
|
6069
|
'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied
[McGinn]
|
6068
|
We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition
[McGinn]
|
6066
|
Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects
[McGinn]
|
6071
|
Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances
[McGinn]
|
6072
|
If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence
[McGinn]
|
6073
|
I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined
[McGinn]
|
6064
|
Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation
[McGinn]
|
6070
|
Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality
[McGinn]
|
6075
|
Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property
[McGinn]
|
6074
|
Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning?
[McGinn]
|
6077
|
Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects
[McGinn]
|
6081
|
Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge
[McGinn]
|
6082
|
If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities
[McGinn]
|
6080
|
Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties
[McGinn]
|
6079
|
If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds
[McGinn]
|
6088
|
Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions
[McGinn]
|
6084
|
'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall
[McGinn]
|
6085
|
The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence
[McGinn]
|
6083
|
The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs
[McGinn]
|
6086
|
Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts
[McGinn]
|
6087
|
Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony
[McGinn]
|
4690
|
If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind
[McGinn]
|
4691
|
If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech
[McGinn]
|
2543
|
Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism
[McGinn]
|
2544
|
Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality
[McGinn]
|
2545
|
Free will is mental causation in action
[McGinn]
|
2546
|
Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge
[McGinn]
|
2547
|
There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood
[McGinn]
|
2539
|
Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion
[McGinn]
|
2540
|
Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind
[McGinn]
|
2542
|
Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity
[McGinn]
|
12019
|
McGinn falsely claims necessity of origin is a special case of the necessity of identity
[Forbes,G on McGinn]
|
18892
|
Suppose a world where I'm from different gametes; add my gametes; which one is more me?
[McGinn]
|
7388
|
McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines
[Dennett on McGinn]
|
3185
|
Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts
[McGinn]
|
6171
|
Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions
[McGinn]
|
22413
|
Being red simply consists in looking red
[McGinn]
|
22415
|
Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements
[McGinn]
|
22416
|
Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible
[McGinn]
|
18410
|
Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness
[McGinn]
|
22417
|
Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes
[McGinn]
|
22414
|
You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness
[McGinn]
|
22412
|
Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences
[McGinn]
|
22418
|
I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases
[McGinn]
|
22420
|
The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant
[McGinn]
|
18402
|
Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act
[McGinn]
|
22421
|
Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception?
[McGinn]
|
22424
|
Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise
[McGinn]
|
22425
|
The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings
[McGinn]
|
22423
|
Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature
[McGinn]
|
22426
|
We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created
[McGinn]
|
22422
|
Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities
[McGinn]
|
22427
|
To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience
[McGinn]
|
22428
|
You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square
[McGinn]
|
7629
|
We see objects 'directly' by representing them
[McGinn]
|