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Single Idea 3202

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism ]

Full Idea

Connectionism offers promising accounts of irrational behaviour, such as people's bias towards positive instances, and their tendency to fall for the gamblers' fallacy.

Clarification

Gamblers think red is more likely if it hasn't come up for a while!

Gist of Idea

Connectionism explains irrationality (such as the Gamblers' Fallacy) quite well

Source

Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 8.8)

Book Ref

Rey,Georges: 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind' [Blackwell 1997], p.231


A Reaction

That is strong support, because the chances of a computational robot having such tendencies is virtually nil, but all humans have the biases referred to (even philosophers).


The 14 ideas with the same theme [mind is the sum of many associations/connections]:

Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman]
Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor]
Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor]
Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor]
Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor]
Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R]
Pattern recognition is puzzling for computation, but makes sense for connectionism [Rey]
Connectionism explains well speed of perception and 'graceful degradation' [Rey]
Connectionism explains irrationality (such as the Gamblers' Fallacy) quite well [Rey]
Connectionism assigns numbers to nodes and branches, and plots the outcomes [Rey]
Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons]
Neural networks can generalise their training, e.g. truths about tigers apply mostly to lions [Pinker]
There are five types of reasoning that seem beyond connectionist systems [Pinker, by PG]
Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes [Machery]